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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys opinions in maritime cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, and state and federal courts in Florida. The survey covers the
period from July 1993 through July 1994.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Forum Non Conveniens
In American Dredging Co. v. Miller,' the Supreme Court affirmed a
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in which the state court ruled
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not available as a defense or
as a means of dismissing an action in lawsuits brought in Louisiana state
courts pursuant to the Jones Act.2 The state court's decision was based
upon a Louisiana statute which disallowed the defense in all cases arising
under maritime law or the Jones Act.' In American Dredging, the plaintiff,
a resident of Mississippi, was injured while serving as a seaman on board
a tugboat operated by the defendant in the Delaware River. The plaintiff
brought suit under the Jones Act against his employer in the district court
for the Parish of Orleans. Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate
court ruled that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Louisiana statute, the
1. 114 S. Ct. 981,990 (1994).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
3. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 123(c) (West 1993).
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maritime doctrine of forum non conveniens applied in the case. After
establishing in its opinion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has
"been given its earliest and most frequent expression in admiralty cases,"
the Court proceeded to hold that the refusal of a state to apply the maritime
doctrine in a maritime lawsuit, brought pursuant to the savings to suitors
clause,5 does not significantly affect a fundamental feature of general
maritime law.
The Court conceded that its decision would create "disuniformity,
6
but nevertheless held that the Louisiana statute prohibiting the application
of forum non conveniens in maritime cases does not impede or impact 'the
proper harmony and uniformity"' 7 of admiralty law because the doctrine is
nothing more than a "supervening venue provision."8  Being a venue
provision, forum non conveniens is procedural and therefore has no effect
on substantive maritime law. According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine
is neither a legal principle nor a rule of law upon which those involved in
maritime endeavors consider or rely upon in managing their enterprises.9
Thus, all state courts are now free to ignore the concept of forum non
conveniens and the jurisprudence developing that doctrine in numerous
maritime cases, and instead apply local concepts of the doctrine, if such
concepts exist. Due deference to the wisdom of the Supreme Court
notwithstanding, it is submitted that there are many in the maritime
community (shipowners, protection and indemnity clubs, and insurance
companies, to name but three) who indeed give due consideration to where
they may be sued in the conduct of their national and international maritime
affairs. It is believed that American Dredging will be read with surprise and
puzzlement by maritime practitioners.
B. Settling Multi-Party Maritime Actions
Two decisions by the United States Supreme Court will have a very
significant impact upon settlements made in multi-party maritime actions.
In McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 0 the Court held that at trial the non-
settling defendants would receive a credit representing the proportionate
4. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 986.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
6. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987.
7. Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)).
8. Id. at 988.
9. Id. at 988-89.
10. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
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fault of the settling defendants." Where there is a partial settlement, the
proportional fault of the settling defendants will be determined at trial. The
remaining defendants will receive a credit against the total liability. The
credit will represent the proportional fault of the settling defendants and not
the amount of the settlement. For example, suppose that one of two
defendants settles with the plaintiff for $100,000. At trial, it is determined
that the loss sustained by the plaintiff was $1,000,000, and that the settling
defendant was 50% at fault for the plaintiffs damages. The remaining
defendant would receive a credit of $500,000 against the total liability of
$1,000,000. In this example, one would say that the plaintiff made a poor
settlement. But it works the other way around. If the plaintiff had received
a $500,000 settlement, and the settling defendant had been found to be 10%
at fault, the remaining defendant is liable for 90% of the total liability after
deducting the 10% proportional fault of the settling defendant.
In Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,12 the
Supreme Court held that a settlement by one of several defendants
extinguished actions for contribution maintained by the non-settling
defendants against the settling defendant. Because the remaining defendants
receive a credit for the proportional fault of the settling defendant and will
thus never pay more than their own share of the loss, actions for contribu-
tion against settling parties are terminated by the settlement.
It is beyond the pale of this article to discuss the conflicts that existed
in maritime decisions which led to the Court accepting certiorari in
McDermott and Boca Grande Club. Nor does space permit a lengthy and
detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court's ruling in these two
cases. Several obvious questions arise from the Court's rulings which
deserve brief comment. What if all of the defendants settle with the
plaintiff? The fundamental rationale of McDermott and Boca Grande Club,
that settlement extinguishes the proportional share of the liability of the
settling defendant, supports the conclusion that in such a situation the
settling defendants would be protected from contribution claims by other
settling defendants; thus, settling defendants would be prohibited from
prosecuting claims for contribution. What happens to contribution claims
between non-settling defendants? This question was not addressed in either
McDermott or Boca Grande Club. However, given the fact that the
decisions in those cases were based upon the concept of proportional fault,
and in light of the Court's holdings in United States v. Reliable Transfer
11. Id. at 1471-72.
12. 114 S. Ct. 1472 (1994).
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Co.'3 and in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,'4 one may
reasonably conclude that contribution claims between remaining defendants
remain viable. This would certainly be the case if the concept of joint and
several liability remains viable.
Was joint and several liability affected by the McDermott and Boca
Grande Club decisions? This issue was directly considered by the Court in
McDermott when the Court pointed out that accepting a proportional share
credit to deal with the settling defendants was not inconsistent with the
application of the rule of joint and several liability as between the non-
settling defendants.'" Thus, a plaintiff will be able to utilize the rule of
joint and several liability against the non-settling defendants.' 6
Do the principles announced in McDermott and Boca Grande Club
apply in maritime cases brought in state courts? The manner in which
partial settlements are treated directly affects the ultimate liability of the
parties and, in this writer's view is substantive, not procedural. Therefore,
the rules of McDermott and Boca Grande Club will surely apply to maritime
cases brought in state court. It is entirely possible that these two decisions
may not be limited to maritime actions. 7 While the conflict resolved by
the Supreme Court in McDermott and Boca Grande Club emerged from
maritime cases, the question of how to deal with partial settlements is not
peculiarly a maritime problem. The proportional credit rule is practical. It
promotes partial settlements, and by extinguishing claims for contribution,
cuts down on litigation. There is no reason the rule should not be applied
in non-maritime cases.
C. Shipowners Turnover Duty
In Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 8 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict existing in the courts of appeals
with respect to the scope of a shipowner's turnover duty and obligation to
warn of latent defects in the stow of cargo. The plaintiff longshoreman was
injured when he slipped on a clear sheet of plastic that had been placed
beneath a stow of bagged cocoa beans which he was helping discharge in
Philadelphia, The sheet of plastic had been placed in the ship by the
13. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
14. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
15. McDermott, 114 S. Ct. at 1471.
16. Id.
17. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. m (1990)
(explaining the competing theories as to how partial settlements were previously handled).
18. 114 S. Ct. 2057, 2062 (1994).
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loading stevedore in Guayaquil, Ecuador. 9 The lower court relied upon
Derr v. KawasakiKisen K.K,2 which held that a shipowner is not required
to supervise a loading stevedore or inspect a loading stevedore's work.2'
By contrast, in Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd.,22 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a shipowner is under a duty to supervise loading
operations conducted by a foreign stevedore.23
The plaintiff longshoreman argued that the shipowner was under a duty
to make an inspection when the loading stevedore completed his cargo
operations. The inspection was for the purpose of ascertaining whether any
hazards existed in the stow following the completion of loading. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court held that the ship's
turnover duty to warn of latent defects in the cargo stow and the cargo area
is a narrow one.24 The shipowner's duty to warn of latent defects is
limited to defects not known to a stevedore and which would not be
"obvious to nor anticipated by a skilled stevedore in the competent
performance of its work." '25 The Court further stated that the shipowner's
duty to exercise reasonable care does not require him or her to supervise
cargo operations of a loading stevedore.26
D. Emotional Distress
In a detailed opinion, the United States Supreme Court held in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshal[27 that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act 28 ("FELA") encompasses an action for emotional distress. As
the Court put it, the duty of employers to use due care to furnish a safe
place for their employees to work includes the "duty under FELA to avoid
subjecting its employees to negligently inflicted emotional injury."29 The
Court discussed at length the test or restrictions to adopt to limit the scope
of this duty and concluded that the zone of danger test best reconciles the
concerns of the common law with the principles underlying our FELA
19. Id. at 2061.
20. 835 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).
21. Id. at 495.
22. 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
23. Id. at 1304.
24. Howlett, 114 S. Ct. at 2067.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2407 (1994).
28. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
29. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2399.
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jurisprudence."0 Under this concept, workers who are within the zone of
physical danger may recover for emotional injury without sustaining
physical trauma or impact.
This decision will certainly impact maritime law inasmuch as the FELA
is incorporated into the Jones Act. In Gaston v. Flowers Transportation,3
the court held that a seaman could not recover for emotional distress without
physical injury.32 The court specifically rejected the zone of danger test
based on the circumstances of this particular case.33 Obviously, Gaston,
as well as many other decisions, will be outdated by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Gottshall.
III. OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided
few cases dealing with maritime matters during the period of this survey.
Generally, such decisions applied established law.
A. Jurisdiction-Limitation of Liability
In Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes,34 the court reversed the dismissal of a
petition for limitation of liability and held that a vessel in dry dock "was in
or on navigable waters at the time of the fire."'35 The district judge, based
upon the recommendation of a magistrate judge, held that because the vessel
was in dry dock at the time of the fire which gave rise to the injury that led
to the filing of the limitation action, it was not on navigable waters and
therefore, it was not within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. 6 The court
of appeals ruled to the contrary and relied upon the decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in The Robert W. Parsons37 and Simmons v. The
Steamship Jefferson.38 In its opinion, the Sea Vessel court also noted that
the Limitation of Liability Act does not furnish an independent ground for
30. Id. at 2400.
31. 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 821.
33. Id. at 820.
34. 23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 349.
36. Id. at 347.
37. 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
38. 215 U.S. 130 (1909).
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maritime jurisdiction." The court also held, contrary to the conclusion of
the district judge, that the repair of a vessel on a dry dock "is a crucial
maritime activity." 0 Thus, the court found that both the "nexus" test of
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland4 and the "substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity" test applied by Sisson v.
Ruby42 had been fulfilled.
B. Personal Jurisdiction-Minimum Contacts
In Francosteel Corp. v. M V Charm,43 the purchaser of a shipload of
steel, a New York company, joined with the seller of the steel, a French
company, to sue the carrying ship in rem, and both the vessel's owner and
manager, which were Danish corporations, for the failure to deliver the steel
in Savannah, Georgia. The ship sank in the Atlantic after loading the steel
in France. The court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the shipowner and ship manager.44 The plaintiffs relied
upon the Georgia long arm statute which the court found conferred personal
jurisdiction to constitutional limits.4" The plaintiff, who was the shipper
of the cargo of steel, subchartered M.V. CHARM from a Dutch company
that in tum had chartered the ship from the defendant shipowner. After the
cargo was loaded in France, bills of lading were issued calling for delivery
of the steel in Savannah, Georgia. The bills of lading were signed by the
master of the ship.46 Both the district judge and the appellate court
assumed that the bills of lading created a contract between the plaintiff
shipper and the defendant shipowner for delivery of the cargo in Georgia.47
However, none of the arrangements which led to the shipload of steel being
dispatched toward Savannah occurred in Georgia. All events giving rise to
the contractual arrangements took place outside of Georgia and, as
mentioned, the ship never reached Savannah. The court found the
shipowner and ship manager's agreement to deliver the cargo of steel in
Savannah was "an isolated and sporadic contact with Georgia ... ,
39. Sea Vessel, 23 F.3d at 348.
40. Id. at 351.
41. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
42. 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990).
43. 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 629.
45. Id. at 627.
46. Id. at 626.
47. Id. at 627.
48. Francosteel, 19 F.3d at 628.
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Accordingly, the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
was affirmed. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz49 and United Rope Distributors, Inc. v.
Seatriumph Marine Corp." The facts in United Rope Distributors were
basically identical to the facts in Francosteel with the exception of the
destination of the ships.
C. Bills of Lading-Package Limitation
In Marine Transportation Services Sea-Barge Group, Inc. v. Python
High Performance Marine Corp.,"' a carrier issued its bill of lading to a
shipper covering the transportation of a boat mold from Miami to San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The bill of lading named Python High Performance Marine
Corporation as the shipper and also identified the consignee in San Juan
who was to receive the mold. The bill of lading was stamped to the effect
that freight was to be collected from the consignee. The boat mold never
arrived in San Juan. The carrier brought suit against the shipper for
nonpayment of freight earned on other goods shipped by the owner of the
boat mold. The shipper, Python High Performance, counterclaimed for loss
of the boat mold. The bill of lading contained a $500 package limitation
identical to the limitation in The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA").52 The district court awarded $40,000 to the shipper for loss
of the boat mold, and held that the shipper had satisfied the bill of lading
provision declaring a higher value for the goods and payment of additional
freight in order to avoid the $500 package limitation. 3 The court of
appeals reversed. 4 It pointed out that the declaration made by the shipper
was not on the face of the bill of lading, as required by law.55 Rather, the
shipper had declared a $100,000 value in the booking notice to the carrier.
The shipper had paid a $50 charge for insurance and the district court held
that this charge satisfied the requirement that additional freight be paid. The
court of appeals disagreed. It pointed out that to comply with the require-
ment to pay additional freight, it is necessary to pay an additional amount
49. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
50. 930 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1991).
51. 16 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 1140-41; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988).
53. Marine Transp. Servs., 16 F.3d at 1141.
54. Id.
55. Id.
19941
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based upon filed tariff rates. 6 In the case in question, the additional
freight would have been $200 and not $50."'
In Marine Transportation Services, the district court also held that the
carrier was guilty of conversion when it refused to deliver other boat molds
shipped by a separate bill of lading to the shipper." The shipper attempted
to pay the freight to the carrier's agent in San Juan, but was told that the
cargo could not be delivered until the carrier heard from the carrier's
lawyer. The district court's holding that the carrier was guilty of conversion
was affirmed. 9 The conversion count was based on Florida law. The
carrier argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for
such a land-based claim. The court of appeals held that the district court
had ancillary jurisdiction to determine the compulsory counterclaim of the
shipper.6
D. Statute of Limitations-Equitable Tolling
In two decisions involving the Suits in Admiralty Act6 and the Public
Vessels Act,6" the Eleventh Circuit held that the doctrine of equitable
tolling did not operate to toll a statute of limitations. In Justice v. United
States,63 the plaintiff filed a timely action under the Public Vessels Act and
the Suits in Admiralty Act. The action was later dismissed without
prejudice and the plaintiff did not appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff started
another lawsuit which in turn was subsequently dismissed because of his
failure to comply with sundry pre-trial proceedings and a court order dealing
with discovery. Unfortunately, since the second lawsuit was brought after
the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under the Public Vessels
Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act, it was dismissed with prejudice.64 In
its opinion, the court pointed out that the doctrine of equitable tolling "is
potentially available" in cases brought under the Public Vessels Act and
Suits in Admiralty Act.65 Nevertheless, the court held that the dismissal
of the earlier lawsuit without prejudice did not permit a later action to be
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 16 F.3d at 1140.
59. Id. at 1137.
60. Id. at 1139.
61. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
62. Id. §§ 781-790.
63. 6 F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1993).
64. Id. at 1477-78; 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988).
65. Justice, 6 F.3d at 1478.
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filed after the limitation period expired.66 Although the court was sympa-
thetic to the plaintiffs plight, it noted in some detail the various avenues
that were open to the plaintiff and his counsel which would have prevented
the action from being time barred.67
In the second case, Raziano v. United States,68 the parents of a
pleasure boater, who died as a result of a collision between his vessel and
an unlit navigational mark, brought suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act
two months after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The parents
had made the United States Coast Guard aware of their claim, and were
negotiating with the Coast Guard prior to filing suit. The district court held
that the Coast Guard had knowledge of the claim and that the statute of
limitations had been equitably tolled.69 The court of appeals reversed.7"
It pointed out that there is a strong public interest in limiting the period of
time in which actions can be brought and negotiations prior to filing suit
will not operate to toll a statute of limitations.7' Moreover, the court found
nothing extraordinary in the circumstances surrounding the negotiations
which would warrant application of equitable relief.72
E. Loss of Society-Loss of Consortium
In a per curiam opinion, the court in Lollie v. Brown Marine Service,
Inc.73 held that neither the Jones Act nor general maritime law permit
recovery for loss of society or loss of consortium in personal injury cases.74
The court relied upon Michel v. Total Transportation, Inc.75 and Murray
v. Anthony J. Bertucci Construction Co.76
F. Jones Act-Seaman's Status
In O'Boyle v. United States,77 the court affirmed the dismissal of a
Jones Act lawsuit brought by a marine biologist serving on board a Japanese
66. Id. at 1478-79.
67. Id.
68. 999 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 1540.
70. Id. at 1542.
71. Id. at 1541.
72. Id. at 1541-42.
73. 995 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993).
74. Id.
75. 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992).
76. 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992).
77. 993 F.2d 211 (1lth Cir. 1993).
1994]
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fishing vessel in international waters.7" The plaintiff biologist was on
board the vessel pursuant to a treaty and federal law79 to compile informa-
tion relating to drift net fishing operations. The plaintiff was not a member
of the crew, had nothing to do with navigation of the fishing boat, was not
paid by the boat owner, owed no duty to the vessel, and had no means of
communicating with the ship's master because the plaintiff spoke English
and the master spoke Japanese. The court was clearly of the opinion that
the biologist was not a seaman and noted that only one who has the status
of a seaman can recover under the Jones Act."° The court cited its earlier
decision in Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc."1 and the United States
Supreme Court decision in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,82
and held an essential ingredient to seaman status is performance of the work
of the ship.83 Since the biologist contributed nothing to the function of the
fishing vessel, he was not a seaman. 4
G. False SOS
United States v. James5 presented an unusual fact situation. A boat
owner radioed the Miami Coast Guard advising the Coast Guard that his
vessel was being boarded by foreign-speaking individuals from a capsized
boat. The Coast Guard dispatched a vessel and a helicopter toward the
offshore position which was some 200 miles from Miami. The Coast Guard
vessel monitored additional radio messages from James, the boat owner, and
concluded that the boat appeared to be in the Miami area and not at sea.
The Coast Guard dispatched a second vessel which also monitored the boat
owner's radio transmissions by direction-finding gear and pinpointed James'
position in the Miami River. 6 At that point the Coast Guard realized it
was dealing with a hoax and went into its "law enforcement" mode.87
78. Id. at 214.
79. Id. at 212. The Shima-Asselein treaty authorized the plaintiff to serve as an
observer on a japanese fishing vessel, as did the Driftnet Monitoring, Assessment, and
Control Act of 1987. Id.
80. Id. at 213-14.
81. 896 F.2d 504 (11th Cir. 1990).
82. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
83. O'Boyle, 993 F.2d at 214.
84. Id.
85. 986 F.2d 441 (11th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 442 n.3.
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James was arrested and convicted of sending a false distress message
in violation of 14 U.S.C. § 88(c). The United States asked that the costs
incurred by the Coast Guard in dispatching vessels and a helicopter,
approximately $5800, be assessed against James pursuant to statute which
provides that one who sends a false distress message is "liable for all costs
the Coast Guard incurs. . . ."" James argued that the statutory provision
was contained in the statutes dealing with rescue operations, not within the
statutes dealing with the law enforcement duties of the Coast Guard.
Therefore, the Coast Guard could recover only its costs incurred during the
rescue phase, which was far less than the total expenses. The district judge
agreed and permitted recovery of only $1000. The court of appeals reversed
and stated the statute meant exactly what it said, that James was liable for
all of the costs incurred in responding to his false distress message.8 9
H. Approved Tariff-Not Subject to Discount
In American Transport Lines, Inc. v. Wrves,9 ° the defendant sought to
avoid paying the plaintiff's bill toward shipping charges by arguing that
there was an oral agreement with the plaintiff not to pay full tariff rates.
The district judge found that the tariff was approved by the federal maritime
commission, and the plaintiff was required to charge the full tariff rates.
The court held the defendants liable for all unpaid freight charges. The
court of appeals affirmed.9 Relying upon Gilbert Imported Hardwoods,
Inc. v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares92 and Allstate Insurance Co.
v. International Shipping Corp., the court held that irrespective of any
oral agreement between the carrier and the shipper, the carrier was required
to charge the full approved tariff rate.94
I. Jones Act-Continuing Tort Theory
In Santiago v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.,9' the plaintiff sought to
avoid a statute of limitations defense to his Jones Act suit by arguing that
under the theory of continuing tort, the statute of limitations did not begin
88. 14 U.S.C. § 88(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
89. James, 986 F.2d at 444.
90. 985 F.2d 1065 (1lth Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 1067.
92. 508 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. 703 F.2d 497 (11 th Cir. 1983).
94. American Transp., 985 F.2d at 1067.
95. 986 F.2d 423 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
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to run until the plaintiff ceased working in the environment involving
exposure to the condition which caused his injury; in this case, loud engine
room noises. It was established that the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant in a vessel's engine room up until the time of trial. The district
court accepted the plaintiff's argument, took the statute of limitations'
defense from the jury, and charged the jury that if they awarded damages
to the plaintiff, they need not be concemed when the damages occurred.96
On appeal, the court suggested that the continuing tort theory might
apply in the Eleventh Circuit, but refused to rule on the question.97 Instead
of deciding the question, the court held that the jury charge was an
inaccurate statement of the continuing tort theory and reversed the district
court's decision because it gave an incorrect statement of law.98 This
seems to be a strange result. Since the court decided that the trial judge
gave an erroneous statement to the jury as to the continuing tort theory, and
reversed for that reason, why did it fail to also decide whether the theory
was applicable to the case?
J. Collision-Pennsylvania Rule-Sovereign Immunity
In Pelican Marine Carriers, Inc. v. City of Tampa,99 the court of
appeals affirmed, without opinion, the decision of a magistrate judge in a
case where a seagoing ship struck a sewer cap maintained by the City of
Tampa.'00 The shipowner sued for the cost of repairs and incidental
expenses.
The magistrate judge divided the damages seventy percent against the
shipowner and thirty percent against the city. The judge applied the Penn-
sylvania Rule'0 ' under which a vessel guilty of violating a statute that was
intended to prevent collisions bears the burden of "showing not merely that
her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not,
but that it could not have been."'02 The statutory fault of the ship was
excessive speed and the shipowner failed to carry its Pennsylvania Rule
burden.' 3
96. Id. at 425-26.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Id. at 427-28.
99. 4 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1993).
100. Pelican Marine Carriers, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 791 F. Supp. 845 (M.D. Fla.
1992), aft'd, 4 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1993).
101. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
102. Id. at 136.
103. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 853.
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The Pennsylvania Rule was also applied to the City of Tampa because
it had violated the permit issued by the United States Corp of Army
Engineers which permitted construction of the sewer cap.' The court
found the city failed to carry its Pennsylvania Rule burden."0 5
The judge apportioned liability on the basis of comparative fault as
required by United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., °6 and as noted, found
both the ship and the city at fault. It is very difficult to predict with any
significant degree of accuracy the apportionment that a court may make in
any given collision case. The reasons stated by courts for the selected
allocation of fault often appear to be arbitrary. In this case, the judge said
the ship was "substantially more at fault than the City.. ,,.0" So, in this
particular case, where the allocation was 70/30, "substantially more" meant
more than twice as much. However, the same facts could have supported
a 50/50, 60/40 or 80/20 allocation without any real fear of being altered by
an appellate court.
Another interesting feature of this case was the city's claim that section
768.28 of the Florida Statutes barred recovery against it of any sum in
excess of $100,000.'08 The judge noted that while the statute indeed
includes municipalities within its scope, 10 9 the statute is not applicable
because general maritime law, and not state law, must be applied to the
collision case, otherwise the uniform application of maritime law would be
affected. 110
K. Unauthorized Law Practice-Tortious Interference With
Contracts
Yanakakis v. Chandris, S.A."' involved the appeal of a jury verdict
of approximately $3.2 million (of which $2.6 million were punitive
damages) in favor of attorneys who represented an injured seaman on a
contingent fee basis. The action against the defendant shipowner and its
insurer was based on tortious interference with the contingent fee agreement
between counsel and the seaman."' The seaman signed a contingent fee
104. Id. at 853-54.
105. Id. at 853.
106. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
107. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 855.
108. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1993).
109. Pelican Marine, 791 F. Supp. at 856.
110. Id.
111. 9 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 1510.
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contract with an out-of-state lawyer who was residing in Florida, but was
not authorized to practice in Florida. The out-of-state lawyer then entered
into another fee arrangement with a Florida law firm. Defendants argued
at trial that the initial fee contract between the out-of-state lawyer and the
seaman was void because it constituted unauthorized practice of law in
violation of section 454.23 of the Florida Statutes."3 Further, because the
initial contract was unauthorized, it was void and could not support a later
agreement with Florida lawyers. The district court held that, under Florida
law, a fee agreement is not void simply because it springs from a void fee
agreement. 1 4 The court of appeals considered the issue to be one of first
impression under Florida law."5 The court certified two questions to the
Florida Supreme Court. First, whether an out-of-state lawyer that enters into
a contingency fee agreement in Florida has engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law which renders the fee agreement void, and second, if such
a contract is void, will a fee agreement with a Florida law firm based
thereon also be void?" 
6
IV. DECISIONS BY UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS IN FLORIDA
There were relatively few admiralty decisions coming from the United
States District Courts in Florida during the period covered by this article.
Indeed, during the first half of 1993, which precedes the starting point for
this survey, there were almost as many cases decided by the district courts
as in the following twelve months. Most of the district court opinions deal
with maritime personal injuries.
A. Bankruptcy-Preferred Mortgages
In the bankruptcy case In re McCoy,"7 a creditor made several loans
to the owners of a fishing vessel. As collateral, the creditor took back
mortgages on real estate and a preferred ship mortgage on the shrimp vessel.
The debtor defaulted, and the creditor brought an admiralty action to
foreclose the preferred ship mortgage in federal court. Thereafter, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy and the foreclosure action was stayed. The court
permitted the creditor to proceed with its foreclosure action on the
113. FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (1993).
114. Chandris, 9 F.3d at 1511.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1513.
117. 163 B.R. 206 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
Vol. 19
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/2
Rinard
understanding that the action would be limited to obtaining an in rem
judgment against the vessel and that the creditor could not seek an in
personam judgment against the debtor."' The district court proceeded to
enter judgment in rem against the vessel for a sum far less than the total
indebtedness. The creditor purchased the vessel at the marshall's sale,
crediting its in rem judgment for the purchase price." 9
The creditor then filed a claim in the pending bankruptcy action for the
balance of the debt. The debtor sought to dismiss the claim on the grounds
of res judicata, arguing that the judgment entered in district court foreclosed
the entire debt. The bankruptcy court rejected the argument. 2 ' It found
only three of the four elements required to establish res judicata were met;
the fourth element was lacking in that there was no identity of causes of
action.'' The bankruptcy court pointed out that the judgment in the
admiralty case was limited to an in rem judgment against the shrimp boat
and that the creditor had been precluded by order of the bankruptcy court
from obtaining an in personam judgment in the ship mortgage foreclosure
action." The bankruptcy judge further noted that even if all of the
elements for applying resjudicata had existed, it would not operate to defeat
the claimant's claim." The court reasoned that the debtor was 'estopped
from asserting the application of res judicata as a defense against the claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding because it had taken the position in the
foreclosure suit that foreclosure had to be limited to an in rem judgment
against the vessel itself.'24
B. Joint and Several Liability-Absent Parties
In Groff v. Chandris, Inc.," 5 a passenger sued for injuries sustained
during a cruise. The defendants sought to have the jury consider the
118. Id. at 208.
119. Id.
120. Id, at 210.
12 1. There are four requirements for a prior judgment to bar a subsequent action: I)
the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) a final
judgment on the merits must have been rendered; 3) the parties, or those in privity with them
must be identical in both actions; and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both
actions. Id, (citing to Ray v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 677 F.2d 818 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983)).
122. McCoy, 163 B.R. at 210.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 835 F. Supp. 1408 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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proportional fault of the Grand Cayman Port Authority, which was not a
party to the action. The defendants argued that the Florida Supreme Court
decision of Fabre v. Marin26 mandated such an allocation. The district
judge rejected the argument and held that in the Eleventh Circuit, a
defendant is not permitted to have the trier of fact ascertain the proportional
fault of an entity that is not a party to the lawsuit.'
The district judge relied upon Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique"2 and Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.'
The court relied upon Edmonds for the proposition that joint tortfeasors are
liable to a plaintiff jointly and severally for full damages. 30 In Ebanks,
the court held that it was error for a district court to allocate fault between
one defendant and another company that was not a party to the lawsuit. 3 '
However, the decisions in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde'32 and Boca
Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. " effectively overruled
Ebanks. In Ebanks, seamen employed on a dredge owned by Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Company sustained injuries when that vessel was struck by
a tank ship owned by Chevron Oil Company. 3 The seamen settled their
claims with the owner of the tank ship and proceeded with an action against
the dredge owner. At trial, the district court found that the tank ship was
100% at fault and although there was negligence involved on the part of the
dredge owner, that negligence did not contribute to the casualty. 3 On
appeal, the dredge owner sought to uphold the jury verdict by arguing that
the result was sanctioned by Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.,'36 which
held that a settlement extinguishes the proportional fault of the settling
tortfeasor.' To avoid Leger, the seamen argued that the decision in
Edmonds reaffirmed the proposition that maritime plaintiffs enjoy the benefit
of joint and several liability and, accordingly, Edmonds required that the
judgment be reversed."' The court of appeals accepted the argument and
126. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
127. Groff, 835 F. Supp. at 1410.
128. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
129. 688 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
130. Groff, 835 F. Supp. at 1410.
131. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 722.
132. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994).
133. 114 S. Ct. 1472 (1994).
134. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 717.
135. Id. at 718.
136. 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 1249-50.
138. Ebanks, 688 F.2d at 720.
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held that Leger did not apply in face of Edmonds, stating "[w]e also agree
that if the mere language of the Leger case could be construed to authorize
the proceedings conducted here by the trial court, then its effect as precedent
has been weakened by Edmonds."'39  The adverse verdict against the
seaman was reversed. 4 ' In sum, Ebanks has been effectively overturned
by Boca Grande Club"' in which the Supreme Court adopted the rule in
McDermott. Thus, Ebanks is no bar to the application of Fabre v. Marin
in a maritime case. Further, Boca Grande Club arguably supports such
application.
C. Limitation of Liability
In re Complaint of Nobles'42 involved a limitation of liability action
that was filed by the owners and the liability insurer of a sixteen foot motor
boat following a collision between the boat and a boathouse. The boat was
operated by the owner's son at the time of the accident. One of the
passengers of the boat died and all other occupants of the boat were
injured. 4
The district court ruled on a number of outstanding motions in the case.
One of the motions granted by the court was to dismiss the boat owner's
liability insurer as a limitation plaintiff. The district court pointed out that
the Limitation of Liability Act" does not give insurers the right to limit
liability. 4
5
The claimants also moved to dismiss the limitation complaint on the
grounds that the court lacked general maritime jurisdiction and that the
limitation statutes do not extend to pleasure boats.' 41 In ruling that there
was maritime jurisdiction, the court relied on Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays,147
in which the court of appeals made it clear that the owners of pleasure
vessels are entitled to seek limitation.44 However, the district court was
139. Id.
140. Id. at 723.
141. 114 S. Ct. at 1472.
142. 842 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
143. Id. at 1432.
144. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
145. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1433. It has long been established that only a vessel
owner or a bare boat charterer considered to be an owner pro hoc vice is entitled to claim
the benefits of the limitation statute.
146. Id. at 1434.
147. 893 F.2d 1225 (1lth Cir. 1990).
148. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1435.
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clearly not enamored of the rule of law which it enforced when it stated:
"Allowing the owners of pleasure craft to limit their liability pursuant to the
Act defies the express purpose of that statute, and provides an unintended
and unjust windfall for the owner of a pleasure craft.' 4 9
In denying the motion to dismiss for lack of maritime jurisdiction, the
court also relied upon Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson5 ' and Sisson
v. Ruby. 5' The Court in Foremost held that maritime jurisdiction is
available only "when [a] ... potential hazard to maritime commerce arises
out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity .. ,, "" In Sisson, the Court ruled that actual disruption of
maritime commerce is not necessary to support admiralty jurisdiction.'53
Such jurisdiction exists if the casualty in question "is likely to disrupt
commercial activity.' 54 The district court then proceeded to apply these
principles to the collision between the pleasure boat and houseboat and ruled
that the operation of a pleasure boat does bear a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity, and that the casualty in question was one that
could potentially impact maritime commerce.55
The interesting aspect of this case was the manner in which the district
court treated the plaintiff's motion to strike various items in the claim filed
by the parents of the passenger killed in the collision. The plaintiff sought
to strike the claim for recovery of losses based on net accumulations of the
expected estate of the decedent. The motion to strike was denied.'56 The
district court supported its denial upon Sea-land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet,'57 a case which permitted a survival action for a longshoreman's
lost future earnings. The court expressly rejected the case of Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., S in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
representatives of a deceased seaman could not recover for his lost future
earnings. 59 The district court stated that Miles did not apply because the
149. Id.
150. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
151. 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
152. 457 U.S. at 675 n.5.
153. 497 U.S. at 363.
154. Id.
155. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1436.
156. Id. at 1434.
157. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
158. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
159. Id. at 37.
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claimants did not base their action on the Jones Act. 6" In other words,
the decedent in the limitation action was not a seaman.
There are two difficulties with the court's conclusion. First, in Miles,
the Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding in Gaudet to the facts of
that case and ruled that Gaudet applies only to longshoremen.' 6' Second,
the rejection of Miles leads to the anomalous result that the representatives
of a non-seaman will recover more and different benefits than will the
representatives of a deceased seaman. This raises obvious questions about
the uniform application of maritime law and seemingly contradicts the
proposition that seamen are wards of the admiralty court.'62 It seems
strange that a seaman whose rights have been jealously protected by
maritime courts for decades is now entitled to a less beneficial remedy than
a passenger killed in a motor boat accident.
The district court's rejection of Miles conflicts with decisions by
Florida courts which have held that damages can be limited in maritime
wrongful death actions brought by parents of deceased recr6ational
boaters.'63
D. Carriage of Goods-Real Party in Interest
A shipper and its cargo insurer brought an action against the carrier for
damage sustained by a shipment of pears transported from Jacksonville to
Santos, Brazil. In Im Ex Trading Co. v. Vessell, Beate Oldendorff, 4 the
court held that neither the shipper nor its insurer had standing to bring the
action because they were not real parties in interest. 65  The terms of
shipment were "FAS Jacksonville."' 66  The court stated, relying upon
York-Shipley, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 67 that title and risk
160. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434 n.9.
161. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (citing Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 573).
162. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
163. See Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 465 (1992); Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
164. 841 F. Supp. 1151 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
165. Id. at 1153.
166. Id. at 1152.
167. 474 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of loss passed to the consignee of the pears once the shipment was delivered
to the carrier in Jacksonville. 6 ' The consignee was not a party to the law-
suit. 1
69
E. Release by Seaman
Antoniou v. Thiokol Corp. Group Long Term Disability Plan
70
involved the construction and effect of a release given by a seaman to settle
a Jones Act lawsuit against his employer. Antoniou was employed as a
cook on board a missile recovery vessel operated by Thiokol Corpora-
tion. '7 He brought an action against his employer under the Jones Act,
which was ultimately settled through mediation. In connection with the
settlement, Antoniou executed a release in favor of the vessel, its underwrit-
ers, and his employer.77 At the time the release was given, Antoniou was
receiving long-term disability benefits from the defendant, and eight months
after he signed the release, those benefits were terminated.1
73
Antoniou sued the disability plan (the "Plan") and the Plan moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the release of Thiokol Corporation also
operated to release the defendant Plan. 174 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the defendant's release defense. 75
The court pointed out that the defendant Plan was a separate legal entity
from Antoniou's employer and that the release made no mention whatsoever
of the benefit plan. 176 The court further noted that under maritime law,
a seaman's release should be construed to be effective only as to those
parties intended to be released.
77
Neither the court nor the plaintiff referred to the heavy burden that
rests with a party who seeks to establish a release given by a seaman. It is
necessary to prove not only that the release was "executed freely" and
"without deception or coercion," but "that it was made by the seaman with
168. Im Ex Trading, 841 F. Supp. at 1152.
169. Id.
170. 849 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
171. Id. at 1532.
172. Id. at 1534.
173. Id. at 1532-33.
174. Id. at 1534.
175. Antoniou, 849 F. Supp. at 1535.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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full understanding of his rights.' ' 78  It is submitted that to carry this
burden, it would have been necessary for the defendant Plan to prove that
at the time the release was given, Antoniou was informed that he was giving
up all rights to benefits presently being received, as well as any and all
future rights to benefits that he might be entitled to receive.'79
F. Suits in Admiralty Act--Service of Complaint
The complaint of a seaman alleging injury while serving on board a
public vessel of the United States was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in Jayne v. United States Department of Navy, Military Sealift
Conimand.80  The court held that the plaintiff failed to serve his com-
plaint "forthwith" as required by the Suits in Admiralty Act.'' The Act
requires service on both the United States Attorney in the district in which
the complaint is filed and upon the Attorney General of the United
States. 2 Relying upon Libby v. United States,"3 the district court held
that the service requirements were conditions placed by the United States
upon its consent to be sued, and were therefore jurisdictional.8 4  The
court also ruled that the "good cause" exception in Rule 40) of Civil Proce-
dure, "'85 which permits a party to avoid dismissal of an action if it can
show good cause as to why service was not effected within 120 days, was
not relevant in determining whether the conditions of 42 U.S.C. § 742 had
been met.8 6
G. Maritime Liens-Assignment-Laches
Galehead, Inc. v. M'V Fratzis M.1'7 presented the ever recurring
situation in which a vessel incurs liens for supplies and necessaries ordered
by a charterer. The charterer goes out of business leaving the bills unpaid
and the lienholders, if fortunate, are able to bring an in rem action against
178. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 248; see also HERBERT BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE
SUPREME COURT § 3-1 (3d ed. 1979).
179. Antoniou, 849 F. Supp. at 1535.
180. 1994 A.M.C. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
181. Id. at 1010 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1988)).
182. Id.
183. 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988).
184. Jayne, 1994 A.M.C. at 1005-06.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 40).
186. Jayne, 1994 A.M.C. at 1009 (citing 42 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1988)).
187. 1994 A.M.C. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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the ship to foreclose their liens. Galehead presented one interesting
difference. Galehead, one of the plaintiffs, sued as the assignee of several
claims giving rise to maritime liens. Galehead is apparently in the business
of enforcing maritime lien claims on a contingency basis. The shipowner
argued that the assignment of maritime liens on a contingency basis was
contrary to law and to the policy of the Federal Maritime Lien Act.S'
The court quickly rejected the shipowner's argument and pointed out that
it is well established that maritime liens can be assigned and that the method
of payment of the consideration for the assignment has no effect on the
validity of such assignments."'
The shipowner also argued that the doctrine of laches made it
inequitable for the liens to be enforced against his ship. The basis for this
claim was the fact that the owner had purchased the ship shortly after the
liens were incurred and the lienholders waited for over two years to enforce
the claims by an action against the ship. The court noted that the law
requires the holder of a maritime lien to exercise a "high degree of
diligence" in enforcing the liens against a purchaser of the vessel who has
no knowledge of the liens.19
Because the plaintiffs in fact arrested the vessel at the first opportunity
following the vessel's return to the United States after the liens were
incurred, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had fulfilled their burden and
rejected the laches defense.' 9'
H. COGSA-Fire Statute
In Banana Services, Inc. v. M/V Tasman Star,'92 a shipload of
bananas and plantains were delivered in a rotting condition at Port Manatee
on board the motor vessel TASMAN STAR. The plaintiff, the shipper of
the cargo, sued for all losses sustained as a result of the cargo being
unmarketable.' 93 The shipowner and charterer raised the fire statute as a
defense.' 94 The district court rejected the rule followed in the Ninth
188. Id. at 1161.
189. Id. at 1161-62.
190. Id. at 1165 (quoting Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. M/V Andino,
1983 A.M.C. 1166 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (citation omitted)).
191. Id. at 1165.
192. 1994 A.M.C. 1617 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
193. Id. at 1621.
194. 46 U.S.C. app. § 182 (1988). Section 1304(2)(b) of COGSA incorporates the fire
statute which specifies that neither a vessel nor its owner is liable for damage to cargos
caused by a fire on board the ship unless the fire was caused by the "actual fault or privity"
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Circuit which requires a carrier to demonstrate that it exercised due
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel before it can invoke the fire
statute. 195 The court applied the cases from the Second and Fifth Circuits
which permit a carrier to invoke the fire statute without an initial showing
of seaworthiness.' 96 If the vessel interests establish that damage was
caused by fire, the burden of proof then goes back to the cargo interests to
prove that the fire was caused by the "design or neglect" of the carrier. 9'
The court found that the vessel proved that the damage was caused by
fire. 9 The plaintiff failed to prove that the fire was caused by the actual
design or neglect of the vessel and carrier.'99
V. FLORIDA DECISIONS
Relatively few decisions involving maritime actions were reported from
the Florida circuit courts during the past year. Moreover, most of the
Florida cases dealt with personal injury claims brought by seamen.
A. Strict Liability--Sailboat Rentals
In Samuel Friedland Family Enterprises v. Amoroso,"' the Florida
Supreme Court held that the concept of strict liability as set out in section
402(A) of the Restatement 0' applied to the renting of sailboats. A hotel
guest was injured as the result of the breaking of a crossbar on the sailboat
she rented at a hotel. The guest brought an action in strict liability against
both the hotel and its tenant who was the owner and renter of the sail-
boat.20 2 In its opinion, the court pointed out that the concept of strict
liability as stated by section 402A of the Restatement °3 was adopted in
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.2 4 The court held that the doctrine applied
to commercial lessors such as the hotel and its tenant.20 5 In the Amoroso
opinion, no mention was made of maritime law or its applicability and the
of the owner. Id. § 1304(2)(b).
195. Banana Servs., 1994 A.M.C. at 1623.
196. Id. at 1623-24.
197. Id. at 1622-24.
198. Id. at 1625.
199. Id.
200. 630 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (Fla. 1994).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
202. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1067.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
204. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1068.
205. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d at 1071.
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exact nature and location of the accident giving rise to the claim was not
discussed. It seems quite possible that the accident could have occurred
while the guest was sailing the boat on navigable waters of the United States
which could lead to the application of maritime law.2"6
B. Jurisdiction-Insufficient Contacts
In American Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson,27 a seaman's
personal injury claim was dismissed because the seaman failed to establish
sufficient contacts between the vessel, its owner, its employer, and the State
of Florida to establish general jurisdiction. The plaintiff was injured while
serving as a crew member on board a vessel in the harbor at Saipan.0 8
Although it is not clear from the court's opinion, the description of the case
assumes that the plaintiff was a United States citizen and probably a resident
of Florida, that the vessel flew the United States flag, and that the defendant
companies were United States corporations headquartered outside of Florida.
Evidently, the vessel was owned by a bank and bareboat chartered. The
bareboat charterer in turn entered into time charters with the United States
and into an operating contract with defendant American Overseas Marine
Corporation. In its opinion, the court describes what appeared to the writer
to be fairly significant contacts between the defendants and the State of
Florida. However, the court held that such contacts were not sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction over the defendant and that it could not
exercise specific jurisdiction in the case because the cause of action arose
outside of the state. 2 9 Although the point was not discussed, one must
assume that the defendant corporation would be subject to general jurisdic-
tion in whatever state they were headquartered and that plaintiff could
pursue them in that venue.
In Waterman Qy v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,21° the court held that
there were insufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction over a
Finnish company. A crew member on one of defendant's cruise ships was
206. A discussion of the application of products liability and the doctrine of strict
liability in maritime law is beyond the scope of this article. A good starting point is the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). Restatement section 402A has also been applied by a
maritime court. See Goldenrod Showboat, Inc. v. Waterways Winona, Inc., 1988 A.M.C. 806
(E.D. Mo. 1986).
207. 632 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
208. Id. at 1125.
209. Id. at 1127-29.
210. 632 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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injured in the Bahamas when a lifeboat on which he was working fell
without warning. The lifeboat had been built and supplied by Waterman
Oy, a Finnish company.2 ' The court rejected Carnival's argument that
Waterman's advertising in European trade publications which had reached
Florida, coupled with the fact that the Finnish company supplied lifeboats,
rescue boats, and tenders to other passenger cruise ships operated routinely
from Florida ports, sufficed to support jurisdiction.2 ' 2 The fact that the
Finnish company knew that its tenders were used on cruise ships operating
out of Florida ports was not determinative. Citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. V. Woodson,213 the court pointed out that the significant question is
whether the relationships the Finnish company had with Florida were such
that it should reasonably anticipate being sued in Florida.21 4 Finding that
the relationships were insufficient, the case was reversed and remanded with
instructions to grant the motion to dismiss."
C. Jurisdiction-Sufficient Contacts
A Delaware corporation owned and operated a pleasure yacht which it
acquired in Fort Lauderdale in 1990 and which was based thereafter in
Miami. The purpose of the yacht was to provide pleasure trips to guests of
the parent corporation of the yacht owner. In Morley v. Lady Allison,
Inc.,216 the court ruled that the yacht owner was engaged in substantial and
continuous business activity in the State of Florida within the meaning of
section 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes."7 The court held that there was
jurisdiction over a claim by one of the seamen of the yacht who was injured
when the vessel was in the Virgin Islands."'
D. Jurisdiction-Foreign Seamen
In Haave v. Tor Husfjord Shipping,219 the court had little trouble
sustaining jurisdiction over a Jones Act suit brought by a foreign seaman.
Although the injury to the seaman occurred in Puerto Limon, Costa Rica,
211. Id. at 725.
212. Id. at 725, 727.
213. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
214. Waterman, 632 So. 2d at 727.
215. Id.
216. 633 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
217. Id. at 1174; FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1991).
218. Morley, 633 So. 2d at 1174.
219. 630 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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the defendant shipowner had an office in the United States and used United
States ports, including ports in Florida for its business operations.22 The
court determined that the defendant had a base of operations in Florida
within the meaning of Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,22' and that the
multiple factors laid down by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen222
favored the exercise of jurisdiction by a Florida court.223
E. Passengers-Breach of Contract of Carriage
In Nadeau v. Costley,224 the court dealt with an action by a passenger
against Carnival Cruise Lines, and a member of it's crew. The plaintiff and
her roommate were assigned a small stateroom aboard the cruise ship
CARNIVALE. During the night, the plaintiff was awakened by her
roommate's screams. The roommate was being sexually assaulted by
Costley, a crew member. When the roommate screamed, Costley ran out of
the stateroom, shutting the door behind him. The women attempted to
telephone for help but the phone in their room was not operating. Costley
returned at intervals throughout the night and verbally assaulted the women
and made efforts to gain entrance to the stateroom. The women remained
in their stateroom throughout the night until they heard other passengers
moving in the passageways in the morning. The incident was immediately
reported to the ship's purser. From the opinion, it appears that the
roommate recovered in her action against the cruise line. However, a
motion to dismiss was entered against plaintiff Nadeau because she was not
physically injured in any way. The trial court ruled that she could not
recover compensatory damages lacking any physical injury and that she
could not sue for emotional injuries without some physical impact.225
The appellate court reversed and held that plaintiff had a cause of
action for breach of contract based "upon a wrongful intentional act by a
member of the ship's crew." '226 The court also held that the trial court
erred by dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the shipowner was vicariously
220. Id. at 623-24.
221. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
222. 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The factors enunciated by the Court were: place of the
wrongful act; law of the flag; allegiance or domicile of the injured; allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; place of contract; inaccessibility of foreign forum; and the law of the
forum. Id. at 582-92.
223. Haave, 630 So. 2d at 624.
224. 634 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
225. Id. at 650.
226. Id. at 651.
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liable for the crew member's intentional infliction of emotional distress.227
The court stated, contrary to the shipowner's argument, that physical injury
is not necessary before a shipowner can be held vicariously liable for the
intentional actions of a crew member.228
F. Jones Act-Seaman's Status
Juneau Tanker Corp. v. Sims229 involved a Jones Act suit by an
unskilled laborer injured on board a tank ship in San Francisco. The
plaintiff was furnished to the shipowner by a Tampa company. The court
concluded that Sims met the seamen's status test established in McDermott
International, Inc. v. Wilander23 ° and Offshore Co. v. Robison,23' and
affirmed summary judgment on the question of seaman status in favor of the
plaintiff. 2 In McDermott International the Supreme Court ruled that one
who is either assigned permanently to a vessel or does a significant part of
his work on board a ship which contributes to the function of the ship or the
fulfillment of its mission is entitled to the status of a Jones Act seaman.233
The Juneau Tanker court noted that the evidence on the issue of seaman's
status did not raise any inference from which the jury could have concluded
that plaintiff was not a seaman.234
In McCann v. SeaEscape Ltd., Inc.,235 a passenger sued claiming she
was injured when the leg of a male dancer hit her in the nose. The dancer
was employed by a company which contracted with the defendant to provide
entertainment on board its cruise ships. The plaintiff alleged that the vessel
owner was responsible for the male dancer because he was an individual
working on board the ship. Summary judgment for the shipowner was
affirmed by the appellate court which held that the male dancer could not
be considered to be a seaman or a member of the crew, relying upon the test
announced in Offshore Co. v. Robison,236 and, therefore, the shipowner
was not liable for his actions.237
227. Id. at 653.
228. Id.
229. 627 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
230. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
231. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
232. Juneau Tanker, 627 So. 2d at 1232.
233. McDermott, Intl, 498 U.S. at 357.
234. Juneau Tanker, 627 So. 2d at 1231.
235. 641 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
236. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
237. McCann, 641 So. 2d at 873.
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G. Unearned Wages-Attorney's Fees
In Moran Towing of Florida, Inc. v. Mays,238 the court reversed a
trial court order that had awarded a seaman in a Jones Act case unearned
wages and attorney's fees based upon the recovery of earned wages.239
The seaman received wages from the date of his injury through the date of
termination of a collective bargaining agreement between the seaman and
his employer. The appellate court found no basis in law for such an award
and held that plaintiff, having been paid wages for the day on which he was
injured, and having no additional obligation of service to the vessel, had no
claim for further unearned wages.24 The attorney's fees award was not
discussed in the court's opinion. Generally, attorney's fees are not awarded
as part of a recovery in a Jones Act case, with the exception of cases where
the employer refuses to pay maintenance and cure.24'
Attorney's fees were also discussed in the case of Royal Caribbean
Corp. v. Modesto,242 although in a different context. In Modesto, the
plaintiff made a demand for judgment pursuant to section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes.243 The defendant did not respond. At trial, the plaintiff
recovered far more than the amount of the demand, but the trial court
refused to award attomey's fees.244 On appeal, the court held that there
was no conflict between maritime law and Florida's rules dealing with
award of attorney's fees following demands for judgment and, accordingly,
reversed the trial court order denying an award of attorney's fees.245
H. Release-Negligence Per Se
A participant in a motorboat race was injured and brought suit against
the race promoter. In Torres v. Offshore Professional Tour, Inc.,246 the
court noted that Florida law required that promoters of events such as races
are required to obtain a permit from the United States Coast Guard. The
238. 620 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
239. Id. at 1092.
240. Id. In a subsequent per curiarn opinion the court again reversed the attorney fee
order. Moran Towing of Florida, Inc. v. Mays, 623 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
241. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). See generallyBAER, supra note 177,
§ 1-7.
242. 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
243. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1989).
244. Royal Caribbean, 614 So. 2d at 518.
245. Id. at 520.
246. 629 So. 2d 192, 193 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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defendant failed to obtain such a permit and the court pointed out that such
failure could be construed to be negligence per se.247 The court held that
the enforcement of a release given by Torres to the promoter which relieved
the promoter from liability for breach of a positive statutory duty would be
against public policy.
2 48
I. Arbitration-Waiver of Right
In Morex Consolidators Corp. v. Industry Shipping & Commerce,
Inc.,249 the plaintiff chartered a ship pursuant to a charter party that
contained a typical arbitration provision. The plaintiff failed to make
scheduled hire payments to the defendant shipowner. The shipowner and
the plaintiff thereafter entered into a stipulation regarding the amount owed
and it contained provisions for entry of judgment thereon if the charterer
further defaulted in making hire payments. The charterer defaulted and the
owner brought suit on the stipulation. The charterer sought to stay the
action pending arbitration.25 The court held that the charterer waived its
right to arbitrate by entering into the stipulation calling for resolution by
litigation.25
1
J. Passenger Ticket-One-Year Suit Clause
In Collins v. Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc.,252 the court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs personal injury claim which was filed eighteen
months after she was injured on board ship. The passenger ticket specified
that actions must be commenced within one year from date of occurrence.
Moreover, the ticket, on its cover, gave ample notice and warning of the fact
that there were limitations on the period in which suits could be brought for
injuries.253 The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that her action
should not have been time barred because the ticket was issued to her
travelling companion and not to her.25 4 The thrust of the court's ruling
247. Id. at 193.
248. Id. at 194.
249. 626 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
250. Id. at 990.
251. Id. at 990-91.
252. 625 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
253. Id. at 1309.
254. Id. at 1309-10.
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is that a passenger who fails to read a copy of her contract of passage, either
before, during, or after the trip, accepts all risk of such failure.255
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases surveyed in this article give rise to several questions which
only future developments may answer. For example, will the principles
decided by the Supreme Court in McDermott and Boca Grande Club be
applied in non-maritime cases? Will the emotional distress remedy which
the Supreme Court laid out in Gottshall be extended to individuals injured
in a maritime environment who are not seamen? Finally, will the limitations
set by the Supreme Court in McDermott International on recoveries by the
estate of a deceased seaman be equally applied in cases involving the
maritime wrongful deaths of non-seamen? Not surprisingly, a survey of
recent developments in any area of the law gives rise to more questions than
are answered.
255. Id.
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